l-ast year brought the fiftieth anniversary of the Uprising. Amidst controversy, L,ech Walgsa, the President of Poland invited the presidents of both Germany and Russia to attend the celebrations along with the representatives of the Allied Forces. Controversial as they were, the invitation and the future visits of both presidents were hailed by the Polish media as a historic opportunity to rekindle the process of reconciliation between Poland and Germany on the one hand and between Poland and Russia on the other. Because of the controversy, Boris Yeltsin declined the invitation and sent his 'special representative', Sergei Filatov. The President of Germany, Roman Herzog attended in person. The anniversary celebrations at which all the representatives made speeches, took place on 1 August 1994 in Warsaw.
Assumptions and objectives
The main assumption upon which this paper is based is that language can be a means of control. While representing extralinguistic reality, Ianguage also shows it from a particular point of view. Being capable of conveying what has been referred to as a ustructure of faith" (see Menz 7989) , a text renders a particular set of values and beliefs which are, in turn, imposed on its addressees. It is also assumedalong the lines of critical language study (cf. e.g. Fowler et al. 1979; Hodge & Kress 1993; Fairclough 1989 Fairclough , 1992 Wodak 1989 ) -that linguistic analysis is capable of revealing the assumptions behind linguistic choices. The indispensable part of such an analysis is one on syntactical and lexico-grammatical levels of a text (cf. Hodge, Kress 1993) .
This paper reports the results of an analysis of trvo speeches made at the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising: President Walgsa's and Mr. Filatov's. Both speakers explicitly spoke of improving Polish-Russian relations. Both referred to (the beginnings of) the Polish-Russian friendship. In this paper I am seeking to find out whether such a positioning of the speeches can actually stand the test of a critical (linguistic) analysis. To what extent can the two speeches be thought to have used the ngreat opportunity" for reconciliation? More concretely I am interested in how the 'difficult issue' of the Soviet participation in the Uprising was handled in the speeches of the Polish and Soviet representatives. The main objective of the paper therefore is to find out how -textually speakingPolish and Soviet troops are positioned as parties in the Warsaw Uprising. A comparison between representations of Soviet and Nazi forces will also be made. I shall also be asking who is represented as having taken part in the military conflict. What were their actions and roles in it? What are the implications of the battle for the present day and the future? In what follows I shall first deal with Walgsa's speech. I shall then compare it with that of the Russian representative. It must be noted that Mr. Filatov delivered his speech in Russian, and was consecutively translated into Polish. The analysis is based on the Polish text, because it is the Polish translation which would have mattered to the audience. It would be interesting in its own right to compare the structures of the original version of the text with its translation. Such an endeavour, however, is outside the scope of the present study.
Walgsa
President Walgsa's speech was by far the longest of all the speeches. As he was the host of the ceremony, his speech not only talks about the events of 50 years earlier, but also directly addresses the representatives of the Allied Forces, Russia and Germany. Walgsa's speech consists of two main parts. The first one tells a brief story of the Uprising, while the other addresses diplomats and veterans. The Uprising is constructed as a response to external forces. Although the Polish expressions zerwa( sig do walki as well as stawat do walki show the subject of the clause as the agent (i.e. a participant who is endowed with the power of purposeful action, who makes things happen according to his/her design or intent), they presuppose at the same time that the subject of the clause is not the primary cause of what happened. The events referred to in (1) and (2) are a result of another party's actions, (normally) a response to a threat or an aggression. Although constructed as an agent, inhabitants of Warsaw (metonymically referred to as 'Warsaw') are not responsible for the fight. The party who actually is responsible is not mentioned throughout the text. Alternatively, as in (3) the Uprising starts, as it were, on its own; discursively there is not even an implicit enemy which can or should be fought. There are only three parties textually rendered as participants in the Warsaw Uprising. The first, as signalled above, are Poles -the uprisers. The second one is the unnamed force the uprisers fight:
Przeciwko Powstancom, pr6cz frontowych, rzucono bowiem represyjne formacje. 'Against the uprisers, apart from front troops, also repressive formations were deployed.'
Although Walgsa adds to the drama of the situation by defining the troops sent to fight the Uprising as repressive, still the Polish President does not mention the participation of Nazi forces. Moreover, agency in (a) is not only suppressed (cf. van Leeuwen 1996) but even further removed by the use of the impersonal "-no/-to" form. Unlike the passive voice in English, this form does not allow for the agent of the action to be realised within the structure of the sentence. The 'external' force therefore is merely implied rather than actually asserted. Now, although the force which started the Uprising is unidentified, there is a clear identification of the one responsible for the fall of the Uprising. This third party in the conflict is, surprisingly, Josif Stalin. Witness: Samob6jcz ? fdecyzja walki] okazala sig ona p62nie1, gdy na racje Powstanc6w Stalin odpowiedzial zgod4 na zagladg miasta. Przem6wil jgzykiem imperatora. Cynicznie odpowiadal aliantom: "W Warszawie sq tylko zamieszki", kiedy konsekwentnie odmawial prawa lqdowania amerykariskim fortecom. 'It [the decision to fight] turned out to be suicidal later, when, in spite of the uprisers' reasoning, Stalin responded by agreeing on the destruction of the city. He spoke in the language of an emperor. He was cynically responding to the Allies: "There are only riots in'Warsaw", when he persistently refused American fortresses [sic] the right to land.' Stalin is constructed as unambiguously responsible for the demise of the Uprising. The declarative, unmodalised sentences allow no doubt that Walgsa is merely reporting facts. Moreover, describing Stalin as speaking as an emperor directly associates him with Russian tsars. Using the word imperator (normally used in reference to Russian tsars), Walgsa invokes the times of Poland's partition at the end of the 18th, the whole of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. By bringing up one of the darkest periods of Polish-Russian relations, Walgsa significantly increases the negativity of the context in which he mentions Stalin.
(s)
The making of history 59 3.2. Alone we stood... The Uprising, according to the Polish speaker, is a conflict between three forces: Poles, Stalin (and thus the Soviet Union) and the unnamed one. Poles were in opposition to the latter two and are constructed as fighting on their own, without friends or allies. Walgsa finishes the 'historical' part of his speech with a representation of Warsaw -and thus, probably, Poland as a whole -with no friends, with no allies: Although the Polish President makes a distinction between the Soviet Union and Russia, still the latter bears the responsibility for the Soviet wrongdoing. Soviet agentsthis time it is the NKVD, the all-powerful security forces of the USSR -are ascribed negative actions. Soviet soldiers, on the other hand, textually, are only afflicted participants of actions -they get killed. Notably, once again, it is not mentioned who did the killing. Interestingly, the mental-state verbs by which aspects of Soviet involvement and actions are introduced are all factive; i.e. they presuppose the truth of the dependent clause. There is still no doubt that the Soviets did what is ascribed to them.
The construction of Germany in terms of agency is different. Although Walgsa mentions uthe murderers of Warsaw", he never explicitly attributes the blame to the German side. The only individual of German origin who is mentioned is Otto Schimek, a Nazi officer who refused to shoot Poles, an act which resulted in his execution: Na tej ziemi spoczywa r6wniez Otto Schimek. 'It is this [Polish] Although it could be argued that the absence of mental-state verbs gives the above a more factual character, yet it seems that -given the contrast with the representation of the Soviet Union/Russia -it can also be construed as a way of acknowledging what happened (admittedly, in a very cautious way), but at the same time leaving it outside of 'lived' history. Such an interpretation seems plausible especially in view of the fact that the only mental action Walgsa ascribes to Poles in reference to Germans is the positive wish to live in friendship with Germans. In the case of the Russians, there are merely seeds of friendship with no particular commitments on the part of Poles:
(11) Zachowujemy tg pamig6 jako ziarno przylalni. 'We keep that memory as a seed of friendship.'
Walgsa's speech is about Poles. First, it is about constructing a history of a tragic nation which was faced with having to fight two independent forces with very little or no help at all. The few uprisers had to face the overpowering forces of the USSR and Nazi Germany and had merely efforts on the part of the Allies to help.
On the other hand, the Poles are given a role barely short of setting the standards of history. The Poles or, as Walgsa puts it, 'we' (all but one uses of 'we' refer to Poles only), are the frequent theme (cf. Halliday 1985) of sentences in the latter part of the Polish President's speech; it is the Poles who may or may not forgive, forget, remember, give absolution. Describing a historical event where Poles were defeated, Walgsa's speech constructs them as those who have the power to pass judgement on the event and those who took part in it. It is now the Poles who are allpowerful and get their five minutes in history.
In the Polish speech only the Soviet party in the conflict is rendered directly 2 Krryho*u is a Polish village where the German Chancellor Helmot Kohl and the then Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki took part in a common Mass during which they exchanged a sign of peace. The event has come to be considered one of the milestones of Polish-German reconciliation.
responsible for anything. Nazi forces are not even mentioned. Similarly, later in the speech, although Russia is separated from the Soviet Union, only negative actions are predicated of Soviet/Russian affiliated agents. Agentivity is ascribed only to one German-related agent -and the context of this agency is positive.
Filatov
There are two parts in Filatov's speech. After a lengthy introduction which he himself could be seen as the author of, he also reads a message from Boris Yeltsin, the President of Russia. Admittedly the double structure is more a diplomatic device, allowing for a personal message from the President of Russia, than an important distinction in the speech
Who knows how it happened
Unlike Walgsa, Filatov does not attempt to reconstruct the history of the Uprising. Moreover, while for the Polish President the history of the Warsaw Uprising is quite clear and unproblematic -especially insofar as Soviet participation in it is concernedit is hardly so in the case of the Russian representative. Witness:
(12) Jeste5my za tym, aby historia Powstania Warszawskiego i stosunk6w polskoradzieckich z tego okresu zostala w pelni ujawniona i zbadana. Pogl4dy historyk6w na ten okres historii czgsto nie pokrywaj4 sig, ale nakaz czas6w oraz m4dro56 polityk6w polegajE na Um, Zeby nawiqzywanie do przeszlosci stanowilo nie barierg migdzy nami, lecz przeciwnie, 2eby wzajemnie chronilo nas przed powt6rzeniem starych blgdow. Jeste6my pewni, 2e tylko droga prawdy historycznej prowadzi do przyjaznych stosunk6w mi€dzy naszymi narodami, kt6re ucierpialy od faszyzmu hitlerowskiego i totalitaryzmu stalinowskiego. 'We support lthe idea that] the history of both the Warsaw Uprising and the Polish-Soviet relations of that period should be entirely revealed and investigated. Historians' views on this period of history often differ, yet the demand of the time as well as the wisdom of politicians consist in that remembrance of the past should not be a barrier between us but, on the contrary, that it should protect us from repeating the old mistakes. We are sure that only the path of historic truth leads to friendly relations between our countries which suffered from Nazi fascism and Stalinist totalitarianism.'
Filatov takes for granted (in a presupposition) that the history of the Uprising has not yet been revealed. And until that happens both nations should not go on remembering the unknown. It can only be damaging to the Russian-Polish relations.
Notice also an interesting use of the pronoun Ve". Admittedly, the initial we refers to Filatov and people on behalf of whom he makes the speech, i.e. President Yeltsin and, perhaps, other Russian authorities. The identity of the '\ve" (nami 'us'
as it is actually used) in the second sentence, however, has changed: it must refer to both Russians and Poles. And thus the initial '$e" in the final sentence may refer to both nations, especially since the final \ve' (realised by the possessive pronoun nasz 'our' must again refer to both parties -Poles and Russians. The text may suggest therefore that it is also the Poles' stance that the truth is yet to be revealed.
It seems, however, that at least something did happen. Filatov first makes a vague reference to some *old mistakes" in Polish and Soviet history and then, later on, to dishonourable mistakes in Russian/Soviet history. It is far from clear, however, what those mistakes are. Consider:
(13) Rosja przezywa obecnie zlo2ony okres przejSciowy od wszechwladzy totalitaryzmu do demokracji, ale ma wystarczajqco sil i determinacji by rozliczyn sig z haniebnymi blgdami przeszlo5ci i nie dopuScid do ich powt6rzenia. Spu6cizna przeszlo5ci nie powinna wplywa6 na budowanie nowych stosunk6w migdzy demokratyczn4 Polsk4 a demokratyczn4 Rosj4. 'Russia is experiencing presently a complicated period of transition from the omnipotence of totalitarianism to democracy, yet she has enough strength and determination to deal with the dishonourable mistakes of the past and not to let them happen again. The legacy of the past ought not to influence the building of new relations between democratic Poland and democratic Russia.'
By referring to mistakes, Filatov seems to achieve two goals. On the one hand, he manages to represent Poland on a par with the Soviet Union: they both made mistakes -even though it is unclear what kind of mistakes. On the other hand, Russia is constructed as a powerful nation, one which will be able to face its own history. Furthermore, whatever the dishonourable mistakes were, they are hardly the fault of Russia. If anything, they should be blamed on totalitarianism.
Interestingly, although according to Filatov it is uncertain what happened 50 years ago, there is at least one thing which is certain: the Poles' enemy was the Nazi forces. Consider: Polish faszystowski 'fascist' -and faszyzm 'fascism' above -cannot mean anything else but Nazi fascism here, in fact the word is normally used to refer to Nazi Germany. As pointed out earlier, Polish stanqC do walki presupposes a response to an attack, one which, this time, came from metonymically rendered Nazis. The expression "fascist tyranny", usecl here probably to add elevation to the style, must strike a false cord in Polish ears. It is one of the most commonly used clich6s in communist propaganda.
Notice that the role of the Nazi forces is not described; it enters the picture through what is attributed to the uprisers. Arguably, in this way the Russian representative escapes the need to present a full account of what happened and thus to deal with the difficult issue of Soviet involvement.
There are more important thinp
The most striking thing about the Filatov speech, however, is that -both in his part and in the message from Yeltsin -it does not even once talk about the Uprising itself! The only five occurrences of the term Powstanie Warszawskie 'Warsaw Uprising' are to be found when an address is made to the participants of the Uprising (three times), when Yeltsin says that the occasion of his message is the anniversary of the Uprising -this is the only time Yeltsin mentions the Uprising at all -and, finally, when Filatov refers to the history of the Uprising which needs to be revealed (cf. (12) above). The main strategy of the speech is actually to claim some common ground between Poland and Russia and, while forgetting the Uprising, to get on with the mutual relations. Poles and Russians are represented, first, as allies in war, and secondly, as having a similar history. Witness Filatov's:
(16) SpuScizna przeszlo(ci nie powinna wplywa6 na budowanie nowych stosunk6w migdzy demokratyczn1 Polskq a demokratycznq Rosja.(...) JesteSmy pewni, i2 tylko droga prawdy historycznej prowadzi do przyjaznych stosunk6w migdzy naszymi narodami, kt6re ucierpialy od faszyzmu hitlerowskiego i totalitaryzmu stalinowskiego. 'The legacy of the past ought not to influence the building of new relations between democratic Poland and democratic Russia. (...) We are certain that it is only the route of historical truth that leads to friendly relations between the two countries which suffered from Nazi fascism and Stalinist totalitarianism.'
Yeltsin refers also to Soviet and Polish victims of war.
(17) w Rosji, jak nigdzie indziej, pamigta sig, czym jest wojna. wiedzq wsryscy, Le Polska i Rosja poniosly najwigksze straty w ludziach. 'ln Russia, like nowhere else, it is remembered what war is. Everyone knows that Poland and Russia sustained the greatest losses in people then.'
As can be observed in Walgsa's speech, one of the Polish beliefs about the war is that the Poles were left out when their fate was agreed upon in Yalta and that their contribution to the war effort has never been appreciated. Russia, therefore, is constructed here as the one country which does remember and appreciate the Poles. Yeltsin attempts to tell the truth about the Poles, moreover the truth which the Poles want to hear. Rhetorically, the move could be seen as a compensation for the lack of references to the Uprising.
Fiends!
The Russian representative, too, speaks of Polish-Russian relations. His speech, however, is more optimistic. Unlike Walgsa, Filatov attempts to show the two countries as having achieved some success in building these relations. There is a base upon which to build, while for Walgsa there was merely a seed of something to develop in the future. Filatov says:
(18) Dzisiaj poziom osiagnigtego zaufania i wzajemnego zrozumienia pozwala nam na rozwigzywanre wielu powstaj4cych problem6w i daje nadziejg na bardzo bliskg dalszq wspolpracg. JesteSmy za wszechstronnym rozszerzeniem wzajemnych kontakt6w na wszystkich szczeblach: Paristwowych, regionalnych i miedzyludzkich. 'Today, the level of achieved trust and mutual understanding allows us to solve the many problems arising and gives hope tor further very close co-operation. We support versatile expansion of mutual contacts at all levels: state, regional and interpersonal.'
Also Yeltsin constructs the Polish-Russian relations as somethins alreadv there. something to be continued rather than started.
(19) Daje to pewnoS6, 2e nasze narody nadal bpdA iSd drog4 przemian demokratycznych,, bedq budowa6 swoje stosunki na zasadach r6wno5ci, szacunku, prawdziwego dobrosgsiedztwa i wzajemnych korzy5ci. 'lt [both countries'victory over Nazism and totalitarianism] makes it certain that our nations will continue to go along the path of democratic changes and to build their relations on the principles of equality, respect, genuine goodneighbourliness and mutual benefits.'
Reconciliation?
There are clear differences between the representation of the Warsaw Uprising in the two speeches. Textually, Walgsa represents the Soviet Union as responsible for the demise of the Uprising. Nazi Germany is not explicitly positioned as the force against which the Uprising was directed. In Filatov's speech. on the other hand, Nazi Germany is blamed for the Uprising. The Soviet Union is situated both as an ally and a country with a similar history, suffering under the same enemies. It seems that the differences between the speeches lie in the political and social contexts of the two countries.
5.I. Politics
In the case of Poland, since 1989 the country has been attempting to shift its political affiliation from the Eastern bloc to Western Europe. Polish governments have made it repeatedly clear that they see Poland's place both within the EU and NATO. And it is the Federal Republic of Germany which gives the strongest support to those aspirations. In his speech Roman Herzog made an explicit reference to German support for those efforts. Furthermore, more than half of the foreign investment in Polandwhich the country needs badly -comes from Germany. Walgsa, therefore, was presented not with a problem of how to tell the 'truth' about the Western neighbour of Poland, but rather, how not to present it as an enemy -after all one does not get support from enemies and neither does one invite enemies to invest at home.
On the other hand, the account of the Soviet participation in the Uprising has always been silenced throughout the reign of communists in Poland. Walgsa's representation gives Poles the satisfaction of eventually getting the 'truth' about the event: the truth they know and expect to hear aloud. Russia also objects to Polish aspirations to join NATO. Once again, therefore, it attempts to exert power over its former satellite. Telling the truth in front of the representative of Russia, therefore, is almost a symbolic act of bravery.
On the other hand, as Russia struggles to transfer from totalitarian communism to democracy, President Yeltsin has continually faced opposition from 'hard-liners' and most notably from the army. Moreover, the Russian political scene has witnessed the emergence of ultra-nationalist forces in the form of, tbr example, Vladimir Zhirinowsky and his party explicitly demanding that the Russian government reinstate the country in its role as an awesome superpower. Any sign of apology to Poland -a former satellite of the USSR -could have been seen as selling the country out, as a weakness a powerful Russia cannot afford. Moreover, claiming common ground between the two countries helps Yeltsin distance himself and Russia in general from its past and, possibly, show the country in a new, democratic light.
Both representations of history -Walgsa's as well as Filatov's -coupled with the absence of President Yeltsin, serve a political purpose and cannot and probably should not be construed in terms of truth.
Polish Messiah and Russian ghosts
There is also a social dimension to the two historical representations. Walgsa, by constructing Poland as a lone fighter for its freedom and independence, ties into a long romanticist tradition of lone fighters against all odds. Polish romanticism (incidentally, the literary period most thoroughly covered in Polish schools) -coinciding with Poland's loss of independence in the 19th century -both in philosophy and literature, saw Poland as called to perform a sacred mission of suffering for and saving the rest of the world, the Messiah of the nations. Both Poland and the romanticist hero represented in literature lost (on Polish national mythologies, see e.g. Baczko 1994 ). Walgsa, however, not only invokes the myth of the romanticist battle but also redeems it. The lone and abandoned Poland at last has the power to absolve or not to absolve, to forgive or not to forgive. Although it was lost in military terms, the Warsaw Uprising has eventually paid off. Walgsa provides a country stricken by economic hardship with a moment of symbolic glamour; more importantly, it is glamour associated with its most beloved myth. Once again -this time in telling the 'truth' about the Soviet Union and intertextually contradicting communist propaganda -Poland has regained independence. Once again -by its attitude towards Germany -Poland has turned out to be generous and special.
Russia's present, on the other hand, is still overshadowed by the Great War for the Motherland. Nothing can or should question the glory of that time. It is the time of the blockade of lrningrad, of the winter of Stalingrad, of the 20 million deaths, by far the largest loss of life suffered by one country. To overturn almost 50 years of continual propaganda based on the Second World War as an all-important part of the cultural heritage of the Soviet Union, on a par only with the 1977 Revolution, is impossible to do in one speech. Especially one addressed to the very people Russians have always been told they first saved, and then protected.
Politics above aII
Reconciliation does not fit into the two national mythologies. Speaking in Warsaw both politicians address their own nations. Walgsa attempted to give the Poles their pride, Filatov attempted to save Russia's face. Reconciliation between the two countries would mean giving up their symbols, which is probably too high a price to pay for either of them. Politically, it is NATO, the EU and foreign investment rather than memories of the Warsaw Pact which are more important to the Poles. Representations of history must reflect those ambitions, as President Walgsa's construction of Germany does. In the short term we have no political stake in reconciliation with Russia, but we care about reconciling with Germany. After all, we may well end up being called the latter's allies. What kind of reconciliation is that, though?
